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Abstract 
 
This study empirically examines the relation between two dimensions of auditor quality: 
auditor independence and auditor specialization, and the level of discretionary accruals, a proxy 
for earnings management. This study focuses on earnings management in response to mounting 
pressure amongst investors, policy makers and corporate governance reformists for mechanism 
to curb excessive opportunistic behaviour amongst corporate management. Auditor independence 
and auditor specialization are the epicentre of this analysis as these two factors are considered to 
be key determinants of earnings management. As earnings management, auditor independence 
and auditor specialization are unobservable, I use absolute discretionary accruals, the ratio of 
non-audit to total fees and auditor industry market share as respective proxies.  
Using 2004 data hand collected from 325 Australian publicly listed firms I find no signif-
icant association between the non-audit/total fee ratio and the magnitude of earnings manage-
ment. Thus, this result suggests the provision of non-audit services by the incumbent auditor does 
not compromise independence and, therefore, the auditor’s ability to constrain earnings man-
agement. This study also fail to find a firm engaging an audit firm with industry specialization 
skills has significantly lower levels of absolute discretionary accruals than a firm using the ser-
vices of a non-specialist. The main findings of this study are robust to various sensitivity checks. 
Findings have implications for various stakeholders. For instance, there is currently appears to 
be a preoccupation amongst corporate governance reformists and policy makers internationally 
to curb the provision of non-audit services by the incumbent auditor to aid in such matters as the 
reduction in earnings management. These findings suggest this preoccupation may be misplaced 
and that constraining the ability of firms purchase non-audit services from the incumbent auditor 
could provide only limited benefits whilst increasing costs. In addition, policy makers and re-
formists need to consider more clearly the costs and benefits of any moves to limit industry con-
centrations within the audit market. 
 
Keywords: auditor independence, earnings management, auditor specialization. 
 
Abstrak 
 
Penelitian ini secara empiris mengkaji hubungan antara dua dimensi kualitas auditor: 
independensi serta spesialisasi auditor, dan tingkat discretionary accruals, sebuah proxy untuk 
manajemen laba. Penelitian ini berfokus pada manajemen laba seiring dengan semakin 
meningkatnya tekanan di kalangan para investor, pembuat kebijakan, dan reformis tata kelola 
perusahaan agar membuat suatu mekanisme untuk mengendalikan perilaku oportunistik yang 
berlebihan di kalangan manajer. Independensi dan spesialisasi auditor menjadi pusat dari 
analisis ini karena kedua faktor tersebut dianggap sebagai penentu kunci dari manajemen laba. 
Sebagaimana manajemen laba, independensi dan spesialisasi auditor merupakan dua hal yang 
tidak bisa diamati. Penelitian ini menggunakan discretionary accruals absolut, rasio jasa non-
audit terhadap jasa total dan pangsa pasar industri auditor sebagai masing-masing proxy. 
Dengan menggunakan data tahun 2004 yang dikumpulkan langsung dari 325 perusahaan 
yang terdaftar di bursa saham Australia, penelitian ini tidak menemukan hubungan yang 
signifikan antara rasio jasa non-audit terhadap jasa total dan besaran manajemen laba. Dengan 
demikian, hasil penelitian ini menunjukkan ketentuan layanan jasa non-audit dari auditor yang 
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ditunjuk tidak menjamin independensi dan tidak mendukung kemampuan auditor untuk mencegah 
manajemen laba. Penelitian ini juga tidak berhasil  menemukan suatu perusahaan yang 
berkaitan dengan perusahaan audit dengan keterampilan spesialisasi yang secara signifikan 
memiliki tingkat discretionary accruals absolut yang lebih rendah dibandingkan dengan 
perusahaan yang menggunakan layanan dari non-spesialis. Hasil temuan utama dari penelitian 
ini tangguh terhadap berbagai pemeriksaan sensitifitas. Hasil penelitian ini juga memberikan 
implikasi bagi berbagai stakeholder. Sebagai upaya untuk mengurangi manajemen laba, saat ini 
pengendalian ketentuan layanan non-audit oleh para auditor menjadi dominasi para reformis 
tata kelola perusahaan dan pembuat kebijakan secara internasional. Temuan-temuan ini 
menunjukkan bahwa perhatian terhadap masalah ini bisa teralihkan sehingga menghambat 
kemampuan perusahaan untuk membayar pelayanan jasa non-audit dari auditor yang hanya 
memberikan sedikit manfaat padahal biaya semakin meningkat. Selain itu, para pembuat 
kebijakan dan para reformis perlu mempertimbangkan dengan lebih jelas mengenai biaya dan 
manfaat dari setiap kegiatan untuk membatasi konsentrasi industri dalam pasar audit.  
 
Kata kunci: independensi auditor, manajemen laba,spesialisasi auditor. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
This study investigates the association 
between earnings management and two major 
auditor qualities: independence and expertise. 
It utilizes a sample of 325 publicly listed com-
panies on the Australian Stock Exchange 
(ASX). The cross-sectional modified Jones 
(1991) model is used to measure discretionary 
accruals (the proxy for earnings management). 
Consistent with previous research, this study 
uses the ratio of non-audit fees to total fees as 
a proxy for auditor independence (e.g., 
Scheiner, 1984; Firth, 1997; Gore, Pope, and 
Singh, 2001; Frankel, Johnson, and Nelson, 
2002; Larcker and Richardson, 2004) and au-
ditor industry market share to proxy auditor 
expertise in an industry sector (e.g., Pearson 
and Trompeter, 1994; Craswell, Francis, and 
Taylor, 1995; Hogan and Jeter, 1999; DeFond, 
Francis, and Wong, 2000). I apply a 20% 
market share threshold across all industries to 
denote an industry specialist. 
Earnings management is an issue of 
growing international importance to investors, 
policy makers, market analysts and the general 
public. For their part, policy makers have 
sought to introduce various corporate govern-
ance reforms designed to aid in the constraint 
of earnings management. Scholars, too, have 
not been apathetic. Healy and Wahlen (1999), 
for example, in a review of the earnings man-
agement literature, called for greater research 
of factors that limit earnings management. An 
area of particular interest and scrutiny amongst 
policy makers, the popular press and scholars 
alike is the influence of the incumbent auditor 
in constraining the magnitude of earnings man-
agement. This study, in response to both the 
growing concern toward earnings management 
and calls for more empirical research, provides 
empirical evidence on two characteristics of 
auditor quality that may influence earnings 
management: (1) auditor independence; and (2) 
auditor industry specialization. 
The principle role of auditing is to en-
sure the quality of the corporate earnings. Dif-
ferences in auditor value are thought to lead to 
variations in the credibility offered, objectivity 
employed and the quality of the earnings pro-
vided by clients. Given auditor quality is mul-
tidimensional and inherently unobservable, no 
single characteristics proxy is used to capture 
this concept. The literature examining earn-
ings management–auditor quality linkages 
have generally followed two streams with one 
concentrating on auditor independence and the 
other auditor specialization. Policy makers 
(Levitt, 1998), popular press articles (e.g., 
MacDonald, 2001; Liesman, Weil, and 
Schroder, 2002) and scholarly researchers 
(e.g., Frankel et al.,  2002; Ashbaugh, LaFond, 
and Mayhew, 2003) have recently linked the 
provision of non-audit services to poor corpo-
rate reported earnings. It is frequently hypoth-
esized the provision of non-audit services can 
strengthen the incumbent auditor’s economic 
bond with the client (Frankel et al., 2002). As 
the proportion of non-audit services to total 
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fees increases the bond intensifies such that it 
increases the auditor’s incentive to acquiesce 
to client pressure, thereby, providing a more 
conducive environment for corporate man-
agement to engage in opportunistic behavior 
(i.e., earnings management) (Simunic, 1984; 
Becker et al., 1998). With respect to auditor 
industry specialization, researchers (e.g., 
Craswell et al., 1995; Balsam, Krishnan, and 
Yang, 2003; Chen, Lin, and Zhou, 2005) have 
hypothesized that a by-product of an audit 
firm opting to specialize in a given industry is 
an improvement in the superiority of services 
provided and credibility afforded to the audi-
tor. Consequently, auditor quality will be en-
hanced. Bonner and Lewis (1990) and Ow-
hoso, Messier and Lynch (2002) provide em-
pirical evidence showing industry specialists 
produce more effective audits. If specializa-
tion enables an auditor to be more effective it 
is then perceived the auditor’s ability to detect 
and constrain earnings management will be 
further enhanced (Krishnan,  2003b). 
Whilst prior literature has examined 
the association between earnings management 
and auditor independence and auditor special-
ization, the empirical findings are mixed. I 
seek to re-examine these issues contributing to 
the literature is several key ways. First, prior 
research examined the two aforementioned 
associations in isolation despite auditor value 
being multidimensional. Vafeas and Theodou-
rou (1998) comment that when focusing on a 
single component of a multidimensional issue 
the failure to control for other key potential 
determinants may lead to spurious relation-
ships and misguided conclusions. This study 
seeks to improve on that notion by accounting 
for auditor independence and auditor speciali-
zation in conjunction. Second, due to data lim-
itation prior auditor specialization studies have 
relied primarily on information from the 1980s 
to mid 1990s (e.g., Ferguson and Stokes, 
2002; Ferguson, Francis, and Stokes, 2003), or 
used total sales or assets to proxy for audit 
services rather than actual audit service fees 
(e.g., Mayhew and Wilkins, 2003). Various 
studies note the audit market has changed con-
siderably in recent years following recent 
structural shifts in audit firms toward a greater 
industry focus. This infers industry specializa-
tion may play an increasingly importance role 
in constraining earnings management (Hogan 
and Jeter, 1999; Solomon, Shields, and Whit-
tington, 1999). The collapse of Arthur Ander-
son and the recent current corporate govern-
ance debate merely reinforces the growing 
importance of auditor specialization. In this 
light, this study contributes to the literature by 
examining the earnings management–auditor 
specialization linkage using 2004 calendar 
year data and using actual audit fees to meas-
ure auditor industry specialization. Finally, 
whilst earnings management – auditor value 
associations are global concerns most of the 
research literature uses U.S. or U.K. data. 
There remains serious question about the abil-
ity to generalize findings to alternative domes-
tic settings such as those were ownership 
structure differs from major Western econo-
mies. This analysis is important for extending 
the international understanding of the associa-
tion between earnings management and both 
auditor independence and auditor specializa-
tion. 
The remainder of this paper is orga-
nized as follows. The next section establishes 
the literature review for developing testable 
hypotheses. Section 3 describes the research 
design. Primary results including descriptive 
statistics, correlations and regression analysis is 
presented in Section 4. Discussion of results 
and implications for future research are dis-
cussed in the concluding section. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND 
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Recent advances in positive-descriptive 
research explicitly acknowledge the existence 
of market imperfections such as information 
asymmetry, transactional uncertainty, and the 
costs associated with contracting and political 
intervention. These problems are recognized as 
agency problems which emerge when conflicts 
of interest between agents and principal affect 
the companies’ business operation. The basic 
assumptions of agency problems are agents 
tend to choose actions that maximise their own 
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personal welfare, therefore, all decisions made 
by agents may or may not be in the best of 
principals. It is considered that this body of lit-
erature provides importance insights into the 
motivations of manipulating earnings by the 
corporate managers.  
 
Auditor Independence and Earnings Man-
agement 
Arens et al. (2002: 28) state that 
independence in auditing means “taking an 
unbiased viewpoint in the performance of audit 
tests, the evaluation of the results and the 
issuance of the audit report”. Independence 
permits auditors to remain objective in drawing 
conclusions about the financial statements that 
they examine. Therefore, it increases the 
quality of audit by providing assurance that the 
auditor will plan and execute the audit 
objectively. Financial statement users will only 
rely on the auditor’s report if they believe the 
auditor is rendering an objective and impartial 
opinion. If the public were to be in doubt that 
the auditor is under the influence of 
management, the audit would lose its value 
(Clikeman, 1998).  
Gill et al. (1999) mention that 
independence has two facets: independence in 
fact and independence in appearance. Both 
independence in fact and independence in 
appearance are complementary; they cannot be 
completely separated from each other. If the 
auditor appears independent, but is not actually 
independent in fact, the audit quality suffers 
and the quality of financial information is 
diminishes. When auditors are independent in 
fact, but users believe them to be advocates for 
the clients, most of the value of the audit 
function will be lost (Carmichael, 1999). 
Independence in appearance is perceived as 
representative of independence in fact, because 
the former can be observed while the latter may 
not (Olazabal and Almer, 2001). Accordingly, 
this study effectively examines independence 
in appearance.  
Agency cost model draws the role of 
the auditors as a monitoring mechanism to re-
duce agency costs (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). Hirst (1994) claims that generally audi-
tors are sensitive to earnings management and 
have a propensity to focus on managerial in-
centives to overstate earnings numbers. Audit-
ing plays an important role both in the reduc-
tion of agency problems and information 
asymmetry by objectively verifying the validity 
of financial statements (Balsam et al., 2003; 
Gay and Simnett, 2003). The effectiveness of 
auditing and its ability to constrain the earnings 
management depend on the objectivity, in other 
words, independence of auditors when perform 
an audit (OICU-IOSCO 2002). Thus, the more 
independent the auditor the more they will con-
strain earnings management. 
There is contradictory empirical evi-
dence pertaining auditor-impaired independ-
ence due to the provision of non-audit ser-
vices.1 Frankel et al. (2002) find a positive and 
significant association between non-audit fees 
and the magnitude of the absolute value of dis-
cretionary accruals. Their findings imply that 
auditors compromised their independence due 
to a large portion of non-audit fees received 
from their audit clients. Gore et al. (2001) doc-
ument the same results as Frankel et al. (2002) 
for non-Big five but not for Big five accounting 
firms. In other words, they suggest that smaller 
firms are more likely to compromise their in-
dependence than larger accounting firms. Antle 
et al. (2002) investigate the relations among 
audit fees, non-audit fees, and discretionary 
accruals in a simultaneous equations model. 
After simultaneously estimating the determi-
nants of audit fees, non-audit fees, and discre-
tionary accruals, they find negative and signifi-
cant association between non-audit fees and 
discretionary accruals. However, after adjusting 
for firm performance, Ashbaugh et al. (2003) 
fail to find any evidence of a relationship be-
tween the provision of non-audit fees and the 
magnitude of earnings management. Finally, 
both Chung and Kallapur (2003) and Reynolds 
et al. (2004) find no association between 
measures of auditor independence and 
measures of earnings management. 
Whilst the empirical literature is mixed, 
I adopt the conventional view that auditor in-
dependence is impaired when the non-
audit/total fee ratio increases, thereby, reducing 
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the auditor’s ability to detect and constrain 
earnings management. Thus, I test the follow-
ing hypothesis: 
H1: There is an inverse relationship between 
the provision of non-audit services to au-
dit clients and the magnitude of earnings 
management. 
 
Auditor Specialization and Earnings Man-
agement 
Specialist auditors are likely to invest 
more in staff recruitment and training, infor-
mation technology, and state-of-the art audit 
technologies than non-specialist auditors 
(Dopuch and Simunic, 1982). According to 
Solomon, Shields and Whittington (1999) audit 
firms are likely to suggest non-error explana-
tions for ratio fluctuations. Thus, the efficiency 
and effectiveness of audit depend on the accu-
racy of auditors’ non-error frequency 
knowledge. In their experimental study, Solo-
mon et al. (1999) find that industry-specialist 
auditors have more accurate knowledge of the 
frequency of financial statement non-error ex-
planations for unexpected ratio fluctuations 
compare to non-specialist auditors.  
Prior empirical studies (e.g., Zhou and 
Elder, 2001; Balsam et al., 2003; Krishnan, 
2003b) support the notion that specialist 
auditors perform a higher quality audit than 
non-specialist auditors; therefore, specialist 
auditors are less likely to allow management 
to manage reported earnings. Zhou and Elder 
(2001) indicate that specialist auditors lower 
earnings management in the initial public of-
ferings process. Balsam et al. (2003) examine 
the effect of auditor specialization on the ab-
solute level of discretionary accruals and earn-
ings response coefficients. They report that 
clients of industry specialist auditors’ have 
lower discretionary accruals and higher earn-
ings response coefficients than clients of non-
specialist auditors. Additionally, Krishnan 
(2003b) find evidence consistent with the ar-
gument that specialist auditors mitigate accru-
als-based earnings management more than 
non-specialist auditors. Following the litera-
ture defined above, this study tests the follow-
ing hypothesis: 
H2: The magnitude of discretionary accruals of 
a firm whose auditor is and industry spe-
cialist are lower than the magnitude of dis-
cretionary accruals of a firm whose auditor 
is a non-specialist. 
 
RESEARCH METHOD 
Sample Selection 
The total number of Australian firms 
listed on the ASX as at 11 December 2004 
was 1,563. Due to the large population of 
listed firms, I randomly collect 450 firms’ an-
nual reports from Aspect Huntley DatAnalysis 
database for the financial year ending on 30 
June 2004. This study focuses on Australian 
incorporated entities listed on the ASX; thus I 
excluded 10 foreign incorporated firms. Con-
sistent with prior research I then eliminated 31 
firms from the finance sector. Firms in this 
sector are subject to different regulatory re-
quirements that could unduly affect abnormal 
accruals and audit fees paid. Mayhew and 
Wilkins (2003) report that audit fees in the 
first year of a firm’s listing may be significant-
ly different from years of normal business op-
erations. Consequently, 30 IPO firms during 
the investigation calendar year are excluded 
from the sample. I was unable to collect suffi-
cient information to calculate proxy for the 
control variables for 49 entities. Finally, I ex-
cluded five outliers (>4 standard deviations 
from the absolute discretionary accruals 
mean).2 Thus, the statistical analysis is based 
on a final useable sample of 325 companies. 
Table 1 Panel A summarizes the sample selec-
tion process, whilst Panel B provides an indus-
try breakdown of the final usable sample that 
is employed in the statistical analysis. 
 
Proxy for Earnings Management 
Consistent with prior literature (DeFond and 
Jiambalvo, 1994; Gul, Chen, and Tsui,  2003), 
this study examines negative and positive dis-
cretionary accruals as both can be used to con-
ceal poor performance or save current earn-
ings for future use. Prior to estimating discre-
tionary accruals I calculate total accruals 
(hereafter TAC) for firm k in year t as the 
change in non-cash current assets less the 
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change in operating current liabilities less de-
preciation and amortization expenses. TAC is: 
TACjt = (∆CAjt - ∆Cashjt) – (∆CLjt - ∆LTDjt  
  - ∆ITPjt) - DPAjt  ........................... (1) 
 
Where: 
TACjt  = total accruals for firm j in time pe-
riod t; 
∆CAjt  = change current assets for firm j 
from time period t-1 to t; 
∆Cashjt = change cash balance for firm j from 
time period t-1 to t; 
∆CLjt  = change current liabilities for firm j 
from time period t-1 to t; 
∆LTDjt = change long-term debt included in 
current liabilities for firm k from 
time period t-1 to t; 
∆ITPjt = change income tax payable for firm 
j from time period t-1 to t; and 
DPAjt = depreciation and amortization ex-
pense for firm j from time period t. 
 
Table 1: Sample used in analysis and industry breakdown 
Panel A: Sample formation 
Description: Number 
Initial sample of Australian listed companies 450 
Less:  
Foreign incorporated companies listed on ASX as at 30 June 2004 10 
Bank and insurance industry firms listed on ASX as at 30 June 2004 31 
Companies that were IPOs during the 2004 calendar year 30 
Firms with insufficient information for which to construct all proxy measures 49 
Outliers 5 
Final sample used 325 
Panel B: Industry breakdown of final sample 
Industry typeΨ  
01 Energy 27 
02 Materials 85 
03 Capital Goods 20 
04 Commercial Services & Supplies 16 
05 Automobiles & Components 11 
06 Hotels, Restaurants & Leisure 10 
07 Media 16 
08 Retailing 12 
09 Food & Staples Retailing 10 
10 Health Care Equipment & Services 12 
11 Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology 20 
12 Real Estate 20 
13 Software & Services 27 
14 Technology Hardware & Equipment 15 
15 Telecommunication Services 12 
16 Other-Transportation & Utilities 12 
Total: 325 
Legend: Ψ – Industry sectors are defined in accordance with the ASX classification schema 
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I then decompose TAC into normal accruals 
(hereafter NAC) and discretionary accruals 
(hereafter ACC) using the cross-sectional 
modified Jones (1991) model defined formally 
as: 
TAC jk,t / TAjk,t-1 = α jt [1/ TAjk,t-1]  
+ βjt [(∆REVjk,t - ∆RECjk,t)/ 
TAjk,t-1] + γj,t [PPEjk,t / 
TAjk,t-1] + εjk,t  ................  (2) 
 
Where: 
TAC jk,t  = total accruals for firm j in industry 
k in year t; 
TAjk,t-1  = are total assets for firm j in indus-
try k at the end of year t-1; 
∆REVjk,t  = change net sales for firm j in indus-
try k between years t-1 and t; 
∆RECjk,t  = change in receivables for firm j in 
industry k between years t-1 and t; 
PPEjk,t  = gross property, plant and equip-
ment for firm j in industry k in the 
year t; 
αj, βj, γj  = industry specific estimated coeffi-
cients; and  
εj  = error term. 
 
NAC is defined as the fitted values from Equa-
tion 2, whilst ACC is the residual (i.e., the dif-
ference between TAC and NAC). ACC is de-
fined formally in Equation (3): 
ACCik,t  = TAC jk,t / TAjk,t-1 - {α jt [1/ TAjk,t-
1]+βjt [(∆REVjk,t - ∆RECjk,t)/ TAjk,t-
1] + γj,t [PPEjk,t / TAjk,t-1]} ........... (3) 
 
Where: αj,t βj,t γj,t are the fitted coefficients 
from Equation 2. 
 
Proxy for Auditor Independence 
Prior literature, in the main, has meas-
ured auditor independence as the ratio of non-
audit fees to total fees (e.g., Scheiner, 1984; 
Firth, 1997; Frankel et al., 2002; Abbott et al., 
2003). This proxy specification for auditor 
independence is also consistent with the posi-
tion of policy makers such as the SEC (SEC, 
2000, Section III.c.5). Some researchers (e.g., 
Frankel et al., 2002; Ashbaugh et al., 2003), 
however, comment the non-audit to total fee 
ratio fails to capture the financial significance 
of a client to the audit firm. Further, cross-
sectional variations in the ratio may “be driven 
by the levels of both non-audit fees and audit 
fees” (Frankel et al., 2002, p.82). In response 
to these concerns alternative proxies designed 
to capture a client’s financial significance 
have been forwarded. For instance, Frankel et 
al. (2002) use the percentile rank of the 
amount of non-audit fees by audit firm, whilst 
DeFond, Raghunandan and Subramanyam 
(2002) and Ashbaugh et al. (2003) use a log 
transformation of audit and non-audit fees. 
Presently there is no theoretical or empirical 
basis supporting the use of one approach over 
another. For reasons of consistency, and to 
better enable comparability of findings with 
the majority of prior research, I report the 
main findings and analysis based on the ratio 
of non-audit fees to total fees (hereafter Non-
AuditRatio).3 
 
Proxy for Auditor Industry Specialization 
Auditor industry specialization cannot 
be observed directly; thus, researchers must 
rely on proxies for relevant estimates. Yard-
ley, Kauffman, Caimey and David (1992) and 
Hogan and Jeter (1999) derived a measure-
ment proxy of auditor industry specialization 
by concentrating on the establishing the pro-
portion of audit fees earned by an audit firm 
from a single industry relative to audit fees 
generated from serving all clients. For many 
prior studies of auditor specialization, particu-
larly those focusing on data where audit fee 
information has not been available, research-
ers (e.g., Kwon, 1996; Krishnan, 2003b) have 
relied on sales revenue or assets as the basis 
for estimating an auditor’s market share. 
Where audit fee data is available, such as in 
Australia and Hong Kong, researchers (e.g., 
Craswell et al., 1995; Ferguson and Stokes, 
2002; Ferguson et al., 2003), the approach de-
fined by Yardley et al. (1992) and Hogan and 
Jeter (1999) also prevails. As audit and non-
audit fee information is available in Australia I 
estimate portfolio market share of audit fees 
for the 2004 calendar year as the sum of all 
audit fees received by the auditor from firms 
serviced in a given ASX industry sector divid-
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ed by the sum of the total audit fees received 
by the auditor for all firms served.4 The fol-
lowing equation defines this measure: 
 
MSik = 
! 
AuditFeeijk
j=1
Jik
"
AuditFee jk
j=1
Jik
"
k=1
K
"
 
 
Where: 
i  = an index of audit firms; 
j  = an index of client firms; 
k  = an index of client industries; 
Ik  = number of audit firms in industry k; 
Jik  = the number of clients served by audit 
firm i in industry k; 
AuditFeeijk = total client audit fees by auditor 
i of client j in industry k; 
MSik = audit fee market share of auditor i in 
industry in industry k. 
 
Previous studies use different ap-
proaches to define auditor specialization with 
most researchers applying an arbitrary market 
share threshold (typically 10–20%) (e.g., Pear-
son and Trompeter, 1994; Craswell et al., 
1995; DeFond et al., 2000; Ferguson and 
Stokes, 2002). Some recent research use an 
alternative approach whereby industry special-
ization is denoted by ranking audit firms by 
market share (e.g., Ferguson et al., 2003), or 
by ranking audit firms and denoting the top 
firm as a specialist if it has a defined lead 
(usually 10–20%) with it next competitor 
(e.g., Mayhew and Wilkins, 2003). This study 
defines an audit firm as a specialist in a given 
industry sector if it has 20% market share.5 
Based on my specification (not tabulated), 
42.42% of audit specialist observations are 
associated with Ernst and Young, with 39.39% 
with PricewaterhouseCoopers. Observations 
for audit specialist associated with Deloitte 
and Touche, and KPMG Peat Marwick is 
6.06% and 12.12% respectively. Following 
prior literature (e.g., Craswell et al., 1995; 
Mayhew and Wilkins, 2003) Specialist is cod-
ed 1 if an audit firm has 20% or more market 
share (measured as defined above) in an in-
dustry sector. Industry is defined using the 
ASX industry sector classifications.6  
 
Proxy for Control Variables 
To control for compounding influences 
of cross-sectional factors I include control var-
iables into the regression analysis. Consistent 
with prior literature (Becker et al.,  1998; 
Reynolds and Francis, 2001; Frankel et al., 
2002), I include firm size (FSize) as prior 
studies indicate that litigation risk is greater 
for larger size clients (Lys and Watts, 1994; 
Heninger, 2001). Also, large companies are 
less likely to engage in earnings management 
due to more scrutiny from financial analysts 
and investors (Zhou and Elder, 2001). This 
study includes ABSTAccruals to control for a 
firm’s ‘accrual-generating potential’ (Becker 
et al., 1998), thus firms with higher absolute 
values of total accruals are likely to have 
greater discretionary accruals (Krishnan,  
2003a). Prior studies show firms with a higher 
likelihood of violating debt agreements are 
more likely to have an incentive to increase 
earnings (e.g., Watts and Zimmerman, 1986; 
Healy and Palepu, 1990; Press and Weintrop, 
1990; DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994; Sweeney, 
1994). Leverage is included to control for this 
possible compounding factor. Previous research 
(e.g., Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney, 1995; 
Frankel et al., 2002; Kothari, Leone, and Was-
ley, 2002) reports discretionary accruals are 
dependent on a firm’s financial performance. 
This is because a firm’s financial performance 
may affect corporate management opportunis-
tic window and the incentives for managing 
earnings. Furthermore, financial performance 
may have a bearing on a firm’s audit risk (Gul 
et al., 2003; Krishnan, 2003a). ROI and Losses 
are included to control for the possible com-
pounding influences of a firm’s financial per-
formance. The perceived quality of the auditor 
is also considered to be a possible determinant 
of the magnitude of earnings management 
(e.g., Frankel et al., 2002; Gul et al., 2003). 
Prior research usually distinguishes between 
non-Big-4 and Big-4 audit firms arguing the 
later are commonly perceived to be of a higher 
quality than the former (Heninger,  2001; 
The Relationship Between Auditor Quality … (Rusmin) 
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Mayhew and Wilkins, 2003). I include Big-4 
as a control for perceived auditor quality. As 
the materials sector is the dominant industry 
group in the Australian capital market, this 
may have an influence on discretionary accru-
als, audit fees and auditor specialization. To 
determine that results are not driven by indus-
try specific features; I include IndMat to con-
trol for industry affects. Becker et al. (1998) 
and Reynolds and Francis (2001) (amongst 
others) report cash flow from operations influ-
ence corporate management actions in manag-
ing earnings. Thus, I include CashFlowOp to 
control for discretionary accruals dependence 
on cash flow from operations. Researchers 
such as Skinner and Sloan (2002), and Chung 
and Kallapur (2003) show that growth firms 
have a greater incentive to engage in earnings 
management. Following this prior research I 
include MV to control for the affects of a 
firm’s growth pattern on the behavior of cor-
porate management to manage earnings. The 
specific proxy measure for the dependent, ex-
perimental and control variables are fully de-
fined in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Variable definition and description 
Variable Description Variable Title 
Dependent Variables  
Absolute DACs firm i for year t- measured by Jones (1991) model. AbsDAC 
Control Variables  
Absolute value of total accruals for firm i divided by total assets for firm I for year 
t-1. ABSTAccurals 
Natural logarithm of the total book reported assets of firm i for their fiscal year t. FSize 
Ratio of book value long-term debt of firm i for year t- to book value total assets of 
firm i for year t. Leverage 
Ratio of earnings before extraordinary items of firm i for year t- to book value total 
assets of firm i for year t. ROI 
Indicator variable with firm i scored one (1) if their incumbent auditor in fiscal year 
t- is a Big-4 firm; otherwise scored zero (0). Big-4 
Indicator variable with firm i scored one (1) if it has occurred a financial loss at 
least once in the three prior fiscal years; otherwise scored zero (0). Losses 
Percentage of outstanding common shares owned by top twenty shareholders of 
firm i for year t-. OwnCon% 
Indicator variable with firm i scored one (1) if from the manufacturing industry; 
otherwise scored zero (0). IndMat 
Ratio of market value for firm i in at end year t- to book value of total assets (less 
intangible assets) for firm i at the end of year t. MV 
Cash flow from operations for firm i during the year t- deflated by total assets as at 
end of year t-1. CashFlowOp 
Experimental Variables  
Ratio of non-audit fees paid by firm i to the external auditor to total audit fees paid 
by firm i to the external auditor in year t. NonAuditRatio 
Indicator variable if the auditor of firm i has 20% or more market share in audit fees 
for an industry; otherwise scored zero (0). Specialist 
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Empirical Model Equations 
I use OLS multiple regressions as the 
main statistical technique to test the hypotheses 
developed above. The main regression models I 
test are defined in the following equations: 
Equation 1:  
AbsDACi = ai + γi1 NonAuditRatio i + αi1 
FSizei + αi2 ABSTAccuralsi + αi3 
Leveragei + αi4ROIi + αi5Big-4i + 
αi6Lossesi + αi7 CashFlowOp i + 
αi8 OwnCon%i + αi9 IndMat i + 
αi10MVi + εi 
Equation 2:  
AbsDACi = ai + γi1 NonAuditRatio i + γi2 Spe-
cialisti + αi1 FSizei + αi2 AB-
STAccuralsi + αi3 Leveragei + 
αi4ROIi + αi5Big-4i + αi6Lossesi + 
αi7 CashFlowOp i + αi8 
OwnCon%i + αi9 IndMati + 
αi10MVi + εi 
Equation 3:  
AbsDACi = ai + γi2 Specialisti + αi1 FSizei + αi2 
ABSTAccuralsi + αi3 Leveragei + 
αi4ROIi + αi5Big-4i + αi6Lossesi + 
αi7 CashFlowOp i + αi8 
OwnCon%i + αi9 IndMat i + 
αi10MVi + εi 
 
If NonAuditRatio and Specialist effect 
absolute discretionary accruals as predicted 
the coefficients γ1 and γ2 should be negative. 
Whilst this study is not testing the effect of 
our control variables on the dependent varia-
ble, based on my intuition and prior research 
referred to above, I expect the coefficient on 
FSize, Leverage, Big-4, Losses, and Cash-
FlowOp to be negative with the sign on AB-
STAccruals, ROI, and MV to be positive. 
There is no prior literature that enables us to 
definitively define a directional sign a priori 
for OwnCon% and IndMat. 
 
RESULTS 
Descriptive Statistics of Independent Variables 
Table 3 shows the composition of total 
fees paid by Australian listed firms’ breakdown 
by the ASX industry classification and the type 
of accounting firms.  
Table 3, Panel A, reports that firms be-
longing to the ASX-Food & Staples Retailing 
sector paid, on average, the highest amount of 
total fees (AUD$670,285) and audit fees 
(AUD$411,526). These amounts are almost 
three times above the sample means 
(AUD$261,722 and AUD$160,896, respective-
ly). For non-audit services, firms in the ASX-
Media sector paid, on average, the highest 
amount of fees (AUD$276,058) amongst other 
industry sectors. Again this amount is nearly 
three times over the mean (AUD$100,825) for 
all industry types.  
On average, total audit fees earned by 
the Australian accounting firms from the Aus-
tralian capital market in the study year 
(AUD$160,896) are much larger than average 
audit fees previous years (1993 to 2000, which 
is AUD$136,406) reported in Caitlin & Taylor 
(2005). On the other hand, average non-audit 
fees received by the Australian accounting 
firms is quite lower than in periods 1993 to 
2000 (AUD$100,825 versus AUD$124,161) 
(Caitlin and Taylor, 2005). Average audit and 
non-audit fees of public client in international 
markets such as U.S. (USD$1,193,952 and 
USD$514,601, respectively) and U.K. 
(£424,233 and £404,820, respectively) far ex-
ceeds that of the average Australian client 
(Ashbaugh et al., 2003; Ferguson, Seow, and 
Young,  2004). Proportionately, Australian 
firms in the ASX-Energy and ASX-Hotels, Res-
taurants & Leisure sectors purchase the highest 
relative level of non-audit services to total fees 
(51.92% and 53.64% respectively) from the 
incumbent auditor. In contrast, firms in the 
ASX-Health Care Equipment & Services and 
ASX-Technology Hardware & Equipment sec-
tors purchase the lowest relative levels of non-
audit services (25.69% and 27.25% respective-
ly). The distribution of the relative level of non-
audit services to total fees from the mean 
across industry sectors shows a relatively nar-
rower range than observed in the U.S. (the low-
est 48.97%; mean 69.00%; the highest 81.05%) 
(Whisenant, Sankaragurusway, and Raghunan-
dan, 2003). Nonetheless, the evidence suggests 
different industries exhibit sizeable variations 
in the relative levels of audit and non-audit ser-
The Relationship Between Auditor Quality … (Rusmin) 
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vices provided by audit firms. It is noted, how-
ever, that audit fees remain the largest compo-
nent (61.48%) of total fees of an Australian au-
dit firm’s revenue stream.7 This figure is signif-
icantly larger than the composition of audit fees 
received by audit firms in the U.S., which is 
51.00% (Frankel et al., 2002), U.K., which is 
51.17% (Ferguson et al., 2004) but quite lower 
than the composition of audit fees received by 
Singaporean audit firms (70.99%). 
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Panel B shows that KPMG earned the 
largest amount of audit (AUD$321,291), non-
audit (AUD$218,369) and, total fees 
(AUD$539,660) from the Australian capital 
market. These amounts are approximately 
twice as much as the sample means of all firms. 
On the other hand, DT received the smallest 
amount of audit (AUD$134,251), non-audit 
(AUD$72,007) and total fees (AUD$206,259) 
from the Australian listed clients. In term of 
non-audit fees, EY received a relatively larger 
portion (43.84%) than other accounting firms.8 
Fees paid by Australian listed companies for 
audit and non-audit services to the Big-4 audit 
firms, on average, are AUD$1,569,018 
(96.26%) compared to AUD$60,961 (3.74%) 
for Non Big-4 audit firms.  
Table 4 depicts the Australian audit 
firm market share by ASX industry classifica-
tion. This table also provides the proportion of 
firms in given industry that used the services of 
a specialist auditor.  
Table 4 reports that KPMG is the big-
gest audit service provider in the Australian 
capital market with a 29.49% market share 
(AUD$15,421,949 out of AUD$52,291,360). 
The second and third dominant audit service 
provider are PWC and EY, who had earned 
27.91% and 23.93%, respectively, of audit fees 
received by all audit firms from the Australian 
capital market. Finally, DT had the lowest 
market share with only 6.42%. 
Table 4 also shows that the Big-4 firms 
audit 57.54% (or 187) of listed companies in 
Australia. The clients of the Big-4 in Australian 
capital market have decreased over periods. For 
examples, in the years 1990-1998, Ferguson 
and Stokes (2002) document around that 
65.00% of the sample firms were audited by 
one of the Big-5 audit firms. Whilst, Caitlin 
and Taylor (2005) report that in the periods 
from 1993 to 2000 the Big-6 audit, on average, 
61.13% of the Australian listed firms. This re-
flects the fact that in the fiscal year ending 30 
June 2004, the Non Big-4 audit firms audit a 
greater proportion of listed firms in Australia 
than they had done in previous periods. The 
Non Big-4 audit firms are less dominant 
(around 15.00%) in the U.S. capital market 
(Becker et al., 1998; Mayhew and Wilkins 
2003; Francis, Reichelt, and Wang, 2005) and 
in the U.K. (about 20.33%) (Ferguson et al., 
2003). No Big-4 audit firm in the Australia 
capital market is more dominant than other 
Big-4 audit firms. The audit fees paid by the 
Australian listed firms are more evenly distrib-
uted among the Big-4 firms than those of the 
Singapore case, especially PWC, EY and 
KPMG. These three accounting firms, on aver-
age, have earned approximately equal market 
share (27.91%, 29.49% and 23.93%, respective-
ly). DT has earned a 6.42% market share.  
The details of auditors’ industry spe-
cialization in Table 4 show that PWC, KPMG 
and EY are specialist auditors in five, 11 and 
eight industry sectors respectively.9 DT is only 
an expertise in the ASX-Technology Hardware 
& Equipment industry.10 In terms of market 
leader per industry (defined as Big-4 audit firm 
with largest market share in a given industry), 
PWC is the lead audit provider in five industry 
sectors (ASX-Materials, ASX-Real Estate, ASX-
Software & Services, ASX-Technology Hard-
ware & Equipment and ASX-Telecommunication 
Services). KPMG is the dominant audit provid-
er in seven industries (ASX-Capital Goods, 
ASX-Automobiles & Components, ASX-Hotels, 
Restaurant & Leisure, ASX-Food & Staples 
Retailing, ASX-Health Care Equipment & Ser-
vices, ASX-Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology 
and ASX-Other-Transportation & Utilities). 
Furthermore, EY is a leader in four industry 
sectors (ASX-Energy, ASX-Commercial Services 
& Supplies, ASX-Media and ASX-Retailing). 
As stated above, the numbers of clients 
audited by the Big-4 firms are 57.54% (187 out 
of 325 firms).11 Of the 187 firms the Big-4 cli-
ents, only 111 firms (or 34.15%) use a special-
ist auditor. The percentages of Australian listed 
firms that employ the Big-4 and specialist audi-
tors are much lower than those of other compa-
rable countries. There is evidence that Big audit 
firms (e.g., DeAngelo, 1981; Becker et al.,  
1998; Francis, Maydew, and Sparks, 1999) and 
specialist auditors (e.g., Reynolds and Francis,  
2001; Balsam et al., 2003; Krishnan,  2003b) 
provide high quality audits than their counter-
parts.
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Firms in the ASX-Health Care Equip-
ment & Services and ASX-Technology Hard-
ware & Equipment sectors appear to use the 
services of a limited number of audit firms. 
Approximately 66.67% of firms in each of both 
these industries use specialist auditor services. 
Contradictory, the ASX-Commercial Services & 
Supplies, ASX-Hotels, Restaurant & Leisure 
and ASX-Food & Staples Retailing are less 
dominated by firms engaging the services of a 
specialist auditor (6.25%, 10.00% and 10.00% 
respectively). Interestingly, while paid the 
highest amount of total fees and audit fees, 
firms in the ASX-Food & Staples Retailing sec-
tor use minimal services of specialist auditors.12 
 
Descriptive Statistics of Dependent and 
Control Variables 
Table 5 provides the descriptive statis-
tics for the study’s dependent and control vari-
ables. Table 5 indicates that average discretion-
ary accruals are -0.90% of the beginning bal-
ance of total assets.13 The lower value of dis-
cretionary accruals for Australian firms is con-
sistent with recent international comparative 
studies (e.g., Bhattacharya, Daouk, and Welker, 
2003; Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki,  2003) that 
earnings management is likely to be more 
prevalent in newly developed and emerging 
economies such as Singapore. However, the 
number of firms that have positive and negative 
discretionary accruals is virtually equal (162 
and 163 firms, respectively). The approximate-
ly equal percentage of positive and negative 
discretionary accruals firms is consistent with 
other research (e.g., Klein,  2002). 
In regard to the control variables, Table 
5 indicates that the average firm total assets in 
year 2004 is AUD$303,730,000. The average 
firm size (measured by the log of total assets) is 
17.23. The average absolute value of total ac-
cruals (ABSTAccruals) is 19.08% of total assets 
at the beginning of the year. An average long-
term debt to total assets ratio (Leverage) of the 
sample firms is 15.24%. This value is slightly 
higher compared to those reported by Fergu-
son, Francis and Stokes (2003) (which is 
11.00%). 
 
Table 5: Descriptive statistics of dependent and control variables  
Variable Description Mean Std Dev Median 25 Percentile 75 Percentile 
Dependent Variable:      
Total Accurals (AUD$,000) -11,558 96,562 -366 -3,948 566 
Deflated Total Accurals -0.0891 0.6812 -0.0337 -0.1076 0.3195 
DACs -0.0090 0.8116 -0.0141 -0.4509 0.3660 
AbsDAC 0.6061 0.5388 0.4291 0.2018 0.8480 
Control Variables:      
Total Assets (AUD$,000) 303,730 855,697 21,149 7,356 132,835 
FSize 17.2301 2.1673 16.8671 15.8110 18.7046 
ABSTAccurals 0.1908 0.6599 0.0749 0.0324 0.1858 
Leverage 0.1524 0.2473 0.0571 0.0015 0.2314 
ROI -0.0702 2.5608 -0.0151 -0.2563 0,0592 
Big-4 (% of Sample) 57.5385     
Losses (% of Sample) 70.4615     
CashFlowOp -0.0899 0.5993 -0.0097 -0.1862 0.1029 
OwnCon% 62.5271 19.1222 65.3200 48.4850 76.7700 
IndMat (% of Sample) 26.1538     
MV 2.7096 5.2131 1.2854 0.7417 2.6196 
Legend: 
Total accruals are defined as the difference between net income before extraordinary and abnormal items, and the 
cash flow from operations. Deflated total accruals are total accruals (as defined above) deflated by lagged total as-
sets. DACs are the accruals prediction error; i.e., the difference between total accruals and estimated expected accru-
als. Total assets are the book value of total assets at the end of year zero. See Table 2 for full definitions and descrip-
tions for the study’s dependent, independent and control variables. 
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In terms of ownership concentration 
(OwnCon%), 62.53% of the equity shares of 
the sample firms are held by the top twenty 
shareholders. Consistent with Holland and 
Ramsay (2003), Gul, Chen and Tsui (2003) and 
Caitlin and Taylor (2005), average ROI and 
cash flow from operations (scaled by the be-
ginning total assets) are negative (-7.02% and -
8.99%, respectively).14 The poor financial per-
formance, as evidenced by 70.46% (229 out of 
325) of the sample firms reporting a loss in the 
past three years, suggests that firms experi-
enced financial suffering during those fiscal 
periods.15 Such performance, might be, affect-
ed by deteriorating world economic conditions 
due to the Asian financial crisis from 1997 to 
1998 and the SARS epidemic in 2001-2002 
(Teo, 2003; Conyon, 2004; Mak and Kusnadi, 
2005). The Big-4 accounting firms audit more 
than half the Australian listed firms in fiscal 
year end 30 June 2004. Around 57.54% of the 
Australian listed firms engage EY, PWC, 
KPMG or DT. Additionally, firms classified as 
Materials Industry (InMat) make up around 
26.15% of the Australian firms that included in 
the sample. Finally, Table 5 shows that average 
market-to-book value (MV) of the sample firms 
is around 2.71 times. 
 
Correlations 
Table 6 presents a correlation matrix 
between the dependent, experimental and con-
trol variables. The upper half of each panel re-
ports Pearson pairwise correlation coefficients 
(crp), the lower half Spearman correlation coef-
ficients (crs). AbsDAC is negatively correlated 
with NonAuditRatio and Specialist both for 
Pearson and Spearman correlations. Although 
the negative correlations between both inde-
pendent variables and dependent variable are as 
expected, these relationships are not significant. 
The dependent variable is positively and signif-
icantly associated with ABSTAccurals both for 
Pearson and Spearman correlations (p<0.01 crp 
and crs). Findings also show a significant posi-
tive correlation (p<0.05 crp and crs) between 
NonAuditRatio and Specialist. As the correla-
tion value is below the critical limits of 0.80 
(Hair et al., 1995; Greene,  1999; Cooper and 
Schindler, 2003) it is suggested that a multicol-
linearity problem between independent varia-
bles is not a serious concern. In respect to cor-
relations between independent and control var-
iables, and amongst control variables them-
selves, the highest correlations are between 
ROI and CashFlowOp, with a coefficient of -
0.747 (p<0.01 crs). This value is, again, below 
the critical limit of 0.80.16 Variance inflation 
factors calculated for all regressions reported in 
Tables 7 to 9 for all independent and control 
variables provide further indications that multi-
collinearity is not a problem in the model esti-
mations (Hair et al., 1995; Greene, 1999; Cooper 
and Schindler,  2003). 
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Multivariate Main Results 
The main results for testing hypotheses 
(H1 and H2) are reported in Table 7 Equation 1 
(in Panel A) and Equation 2 (in Panel B) test 
the association of auditor independence and 
auditor specialization to the dependent variable 
in isolation. Equation 3 considers the effects of 
both independence and specialization in con-
junction.  
Regression model estimates reported in 
Table 7, Panels A, B and C, are all statistically 
significant (F-statistic p<0.01). The model in 
Table 7, Panel C (28.50%), explains the most 
variance in the dependent variable and that for 
Table 7, Panel B (28.70%), the least. The coef-
ficients on NonAuditRatio are positive,17 in 
both Panel A and C, but statistically insignifi-
cant.18 These findings do not support the ac-
ceptance of H1. The findings of no relationship 
between non-audit fees and the measures of 
earnings management is consistent with some 
prior studies (e.g., Chung and Kallapur, 2003; 
Reynolds et al., 2004). Consistent with the hy-
pothesis, suggesting that the magnitude of earn-
ings management is significantly lower 
amongst firms engaging a specialist audit firm 
relative to those using the audit services of a 
non-specialist, the coefficients on Specialist are 
negative. However, this prediction is statistical-
ly insignificant and, therefore, the results do not 
support H2.  
In regard to control variables, the coef-
ficients on ABSTAccruals are positive and sig-
nificant (p<0.01) across all regression models. 
This finding is consistent with prior research 
(e.g., Frankel et al., 2002; Ashbaugh et al., 
2003; Balsam et al., 2003). Coefficients on 
IndMat are all negative and significant at 
p<0.10.19 These results fail to confirm the ar-
gument that the Australian mining companies 
tend to manage reported earnings more than 
other industry companies (Godfrey and Koh,  
1998). The coefficients on CashFlowOp are all 
negatively and significantly (p<0.01) associat-
ed with the measure of earnings management. 
These results are consistent with Dechow, 
Sloan and  Sweeney (1995) and Peasnell, Pope  
and Young (2000) who suggest a negative rela-
tionship between cash flow from operations 
and earnings management.  
 
Table 7: Multiple Regression results audit fees and specialization for absolute discretionary accruals 
 Predic-
tion 
Panel A–Equation 1 Panel B–Equation 2 Panel C–Equation 3 
Beta t-statistic Beta t-statistic Beta t-statistic 
(Constant)   3.825*  3.680*  3.725* 
ABSTAccurals + 0.545 10.914* 0.545 10.944* 0.548 10.945* 
FSize - 0.089 1.189 0.109 1.513 0.096 1.283 
Leverage + -0.017 -0.326 -0.014 -0.256 -0.017 -0.317 
ROI - -0.080 -1.170 -0.083 -1.215 -0.081 -1.178 
Big-4 - -0.077 -1.448 -0.039 -0.604 -0.044 -0.681 
Losses + -0.007 -0.109 -0.003 -0.052 -0.106 -0.915 
OwnCon% - -0.049 -0.992 -0.049 -0.986 -0.049 -0.992 
IndMat + -0.090 -1.860*** -0.090 -1.864*** -0.091 -1.880*** 
MV + -0.020 -0.365 -0.012 -0.233 -0.016 -0.295 
CashFlowOp - -0.148 -2.820* -0.147 -2.804* -0.146 -2.790* 
NonAuditRatio - 0.035 0.682   0.031 0.603 
Specialist -   -0.058 -0.941 -0.054 -0.884 
Model Summary    
R-Squared  0.310 0.311 0.312 
Adj. R-Squared  0.286 0.287 0.285 
F-Statistic  12.789* 12.844* 11.870* 
Sample Size  325 325 325 
Legend: 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at p<0.01, p<0.05 and p<0.10, respectively (based on two-tailed tests). See 
Table 2 for full definitions and descriptions for the dependent, independent and control variables. 
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Directional signs on the coefficients for 
Leverage and Losses contradict with previous 
works (e.g., Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; 
Klein, 2002), but are consistent with Frankel et 
al. (2002) and Krishnan (2003b). However, 
those coefficients are not significant. Moreo-
ver, directional signs on the coefficients of re-
maining control variables are generally con-
sistent with prior related research (e.g., Peasnell 
et al., 2000; Davidson et al., 2005; Francis et 
al., 2005). Again, all coefficients are insignifi-
cant. 
 
Multivariate Results for Partitioned Sub-
samples 
Prior research (e.g., Reynolds and Fran-
cis, 2001; Frankel et al., 2002; Gul et al., 2003) 
generally partition pooled samples by income-
incentives and client firm size as these traits are 
frequently thought to influence management 
opportunistic behaviour. Following prior stud-
ies, this section presents the results of multiple 
regression tests performed on sub-samples par-
titioned by the directional sign on the discre-
tionary accruals and firm size. All equations are 
performed as presented in Table 7. For brevity, 
this section only reports findings of multivari-
ate results for partitioned sub-samples based on 
Equation 3. Findings based on the other equa-
tions (Equation 1 and Equation 2), however, are 
reflective of those reported in Tables 8 and 9.  
 
Discretionary accruals sign 
Partitioning the pooled sample into in-
come-increasing and income-decreasing is 
based on the sign on their corresponding unad-
justed discretionary accruals. The multivariate 
results from regressions of these two groups 
sample are provided in Table 8.  
As shown in Table 8, Panel A (Panel 
B), the coefficient on NonAuditRatio is nega-
tive (positive) for the income-increasing (in-
come-decreasing) sub-samples. The positive 
sign of coefficient on NonAuditRatio for the 
income-decreasing sub-sample is consistent 
with the inferences for the absolute discretion-
ary accruals regressions reported in Table 7. 
The negative sign of coefficient on NonAudit-
Ratio for the income-increasing sub-sample 
infers that the big portion of Australian non-
audit services may not impair auditors’ ability 
to constrain the magnitude of earnings man-
agement. However, the coefficients on both 
income-increasing (Panel A) and decreasing 
(Panel B) are statistically not significant. In 
conclusion, the results imply that auditor inde-
pendence is shown to be an insignificant factor 
in reducing the level of earnings management 
by Australian firms, regardless of whether cor-
porate management has an incentive to increase 
or decrease reported earnings.  
Separating estimations for Specialist 
categorisation into income-increasing and de-
creasing sub-samples does not provide com-
prehensive support for the inferences about the 
absolute discretionary accrual regressions re-
ported in Table 7. The coefficients on Special-
ist for both Australian sub-samples are negative 
and moderately significant (p<0.10) in the in-
come-increasing sub-sample (see Panel A). 
This result suggests that auditor specialisation 
is a moderately significant factor in constrain-
ing the magnitude of earnings management 
when corporate management face incentives to 
increase reported accounting earnings. This 
finding infers Australian auditors seem to per-
ceive that the opportunistic application of gen-
erally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) 
or income-increasing discretionary accruals are 
more risky than the conservative application of 
GAAP or income-decreasing discretionary ac-
cruals. The findings are consistent with St. 
Pierre and Anderson (1984) who document that 
auditors are usually sued for allowing man-
agement to overstate their reported earnings. 
Becker et al. (1998) argue that income-
increasing earnings management which reflect 
an opportunistic application of GAAP is more 
likely signalling problems with auditor inde-
pendence. As a result, the income-increasing 
earnings management is more of a concern to 
regulators and financial statements users (Ash-
baugh et al.,  2003).  
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Table 8: Multiple Regression results for sample partitioning by discretionary accruals sign 
 
Prediction 
Discretionary Accruals Sign 
Panel A-Income Increasing Panel B-Income Decreasing 
Beta t-statistic Beta t-statistic 
(Constant)   3.633*  -0.547 
ABSTAccurals + 0.564 8.481* 0.608 8.140* 
FSize - 0.127 1.357 0.117 1.026 
Leverage + 0.076 1.080 -0.168 -2.111** 
ROI - -0.066 -0.722 0.010 0.101 
Big-4 - -0.069 -0.777 -0.161 -1.830*** 
Losses + 0.055 0.677 -0.102 -1.211 
OwnCon% - -0.151 -2.155** 0.051 0.761 
IndMat + -0.098 -1.444 -0.111 -1.655*** 
MV + 0.088 1.243 -0.159 -2.032** 
CashFlowOp - -0.334 -4.835* 0.211 2.741* 
NonAuditRatio - -0.001 -0.009 0.084 1.128 
Specialist - -0.157 -1.870*** -0.045 -0.523 
Model Summary    
R-Squared  0.428 0.385 
Adj. R-Squared  0.382 0.335 
F-Statistic  9.302* 7.816* 
Sample Size  162 163 
Legend:  
*, **, and *** indicate significance at p<0.01, p<0.05 and p<0.10, respectively (based on two-tailed tests). See Ta-
ble 2 for full definitions and descriptions for the dependent, independent and control variables. 
 
Table 9: Multiple Regression results for partitioning by client firm size 
 
Prediction 
Client firm size 
Panel A-Small Firms Panel B-Large Firms 
Beta t-statistic Beta t-statistic 
(Constant)   -0.285  3.668* 
ABSTAccurals + 0.547 7.663* 0.550 7.636* 
FSize - 0.162 1.975** 0.015 0.170 
Leverage + -0.044 -0.626 0.064 0.849 
ROI - 0.024 0.264 -0.164 -2.024** 
Big-4 - 0.014 0.155 -0.053 -0.623 
Losses + 0.011 0.146 -0.091 -1.099 
OwnCon% - -0.090 -1.229 -0.004 -0.056 
IndMat + -0.143 -2.076** -0.077 -1.118 
MV + 0.059 0.780 -0.091 -1.223 
CashFlowOp - 0.052 0.667 -0.234 -3.274* 
NonAuditRatio - 0.085 1.231 -0.024 -0.330 
Specialist - -0.082 -0.921 -0.039 -0.468 
Model Summary    
R-Squared  0.358 0.347 
Adj. R-Squared  0.307 0.294 
F-Statistic  6.971* 6.585* 
Sample Size  163 162 
Legend:  
*, **, and *** indicate significance at p<0.01, p<0.05 and p<0.10, respectively (based on two-tailed tests). See Ta-
ble 2 for full definitions and descriptions for the dependent, independent and control variables. 
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In the full sample, there are three con-
trol variables, ABSTAccruals, InMat and 
CashFlowOp that are significantly associated 
with the absolute value of discretionary accru-
als (see Table 7). These three control variables 
are consistently significant when dividing sam-
ple according to income incentives, except for 
the InMat. The coefficient on InMat is only 
significant in the income-decreasing sub-
sample (see Table 8, Panel B). This suggests 
that the significance of the InMat variable in 
the full sample is driven by income-decreasing 
discretionary accruals. In addition, the coeffi-
cients on Leverage, Big-4 and MV are negative-
ly and significantly (p<0.05, p<0.10 and 
p<0.05, respectively) related with the earnings 
management measure in income-decreasing 
sub-sample. Furthermore, the coefficient on 
OwnCon% is negative and significant (p<0.05) 
in the income-increasing sub-sample. The 
negative association between the Big-4 and MV 
variables and income-decreasing earnings 
management is consistent with evidence re-
ported by Frankel et al. (2002). 
 
Client firm size  
Table 9 provides the multivariate re-
sults from regressions for the small (Panel A) 
and large (Panel B) client firm sub-samples. 
The cut-off point for partitioning the pooled 
sample into these two groups is made accord-
ing to the median of total assets 
(AUD$21,149,000).  
As presented in Table 9, Panel A (Panel 
B), the coefficients on NonAuditRatio are posi-
tive (negative) for the small (large) firm sub-
samples. The positive sign on coefficient of 
NonAuditRatio for the small firm sub-sample is 
consistent with the main findings, as reported 
in Table 7. The findings from the sample parti-
tioning by client firm size suggest that auditors 
are likely to impair their independence when 
they audit the small clients but not for the large 
audit clients. However, these results are statis-
tically insignificant. It appears that client firm 
size does not unduly influence the association 
between auditor independence and the magni-
tude of earnings management. The coefficients 
on Specialist are negative but insignificant for 
both small (Panel A) and large (Panel B) client 
sub-samples. These results are consistent with 
the primary findings as reported in Table 7. It 
implies that a client’s size does not affect the 
association between audit specialisation and 
earnings management.  
In the full sample, the coefficient on 
ABSTAccruals is positive and significant for 
both small and large firms sub-sample. Howev-
er, the coefficients on InMat and CashFlowOp 
are negatively and significantly associated with 
the earnings management proxy for small and 
large client firms, respectively. This infers that 
the small (large) clients drive the negative and 
significant relationship between InMat (Cash-
FlowOp) and the absolute value of discretion-
ary accruals. Unlike the full sample, the coeffi-
cients on FSize (ROI) are positive (negative) 
and significant (at a p<0.05) associated with the 
measure of earnings management in the small 
(large) client sub-sample. 
 
Additional Sensitivity and Robustness 
Checks 
Apart from partitioning the pooled 
sample according to income-incentives and 
firm size, I perform additional sensitivity and 
robustness checks (for brevity, the results are 
not presented) to further ensure the inferences 
drawn thus far are valid. First, whilst the use 
of the modified Jones (1991) model is widely 
cited in the literature its application is not free 
from criticism. Researchers, for example, Ber-
nard and Skinner (1996); Guay, Kothari and 
Watts (1996); Healy and Palepu (2001) argue 
the estimates from the modified Jones (1991) 
is biased with measurement errors therewith 
could potentially induce erroneous conclu-
sions about the presence of earnings manage-
ment. In light of such criticism I estimated 
discretionary accruals again using alternative 
techniques including: (a) the original specified 
Jones (1991) model; (b) inclusion (in separate 
estimations) to the modified Jones (1991) 
model of (i) cash flow operating activities 
(Dechow, 1994; Kim, Chung, and Firth, 
2003); (ii) return on assets. All findings from 
use of alternative discretionary accrual model 
estimates do not facilitate any significant qual-
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itative change in results as reported in Table 7. 
A point of note, however, is that the explana-
tory of the additional regressions tend to be 
lower when the model estimation of discre-
tionary accruals is more restrictive (i.e., in-
cludes more variables to such as cash flow 
from operations) that may be associated with 
total accruals. 
Second, as noted above the ratio of 
non-audit service fee to total fees is extensive-
ly utilized in the research literature to proxy 
for auditor independence impairment (e.g., 
Parkash and Venable,  1993; Firth, 1997; 
Frankel et al.,  2002). Application of this 
proxy is consistent with results of the 
Earnscliffe Research and Communications 
(1999) survey that finds there is a perception 
that auditor independence is impaired when 
the amount of non-audit fees is large relative 
to audit fees. The non-audit/total fee ratio, 
however, is not free of criticism such as fail-
ing to capture client importance. Following 
Frankel et al. (2002) I construct several alter-
native measures of auditor independence in-
cluding: (a) percentile rank of non-audit, audit 
and total fees by auditor; (b) logarithm trans-
formation of audit and non-audit fees; and (c) 
ratio of non-audit fees to audit fees. Tests 
based on Models 1 to 3 performed using these 
alternative proxies for auditor independence 
generally yields consistent results with Table 7 
results. One difference of note, however, is 
that when using the percentile rank of non-
audit fees by auditor the coefficients are mod-
erately positively significant at conventional 
levels (i.e., t-statistic ranging from 1.673 for 
test based on Model 1 to 1.708 for Model 3). 
Whilst findings using the percentile rank of 
non-audit fee by auditor are not entirely defin-
itive the results may suggest the auditor’s abil-
ity to detect and constrain earnings manage-
ment is reduced when independence is im-
paired but in cases where the client’s im-
portance to the auditor is high. 
Third, whilst I follow prior literature 
(e.g., Pearson and Trompeter, 1994; Craswell 
et al., 1995; DeFond et al., 2000) in using an 
arbitrary threshold to denote market share and 
subsequently industry specialization, this ap-
proach is not free of criticism. To determine if 
the findings are not driven by the arbitrarily 
applied cutoff threshold of 20%, this study 
uses alternative benchmarks of 10, 15, 25 and 
30 percent. Regardless of whether I tighten or 
loosen my cutoff threshold, the coefficients on 
Specialist in additional sensitivity tests are 
consistent with Table 7 results. The findings 
infer Table 7 findings are not driven by my 
selection of a cutoff threshold. In an additional 
test I follow the recent derived approach of 
Ferguson et al. (2003) where industry rank-
ings based on market shares within each in-
dustry to denote industry specialization. 
Again, tests using this second alternative 
proxy for auditor specialization yield con-
sistent results with Table 7 findings. 
Finally, in line with Ferguson et al. 
(2003), I run several regressions after alterna-
tively excluding large industry clusters (name-
ly Commerce – Wholesale, Construction and 
Manufacturing – Electrical Products). I also 
perform the same tests after alternatively elim-
inating each Big-4 audit firm to make sure in-
dividual Big-4 entities do not drive the results. 
Again, findings of my experimental variables 
hold. This infers this study’s results are not 
sensitive to industry and Big-4 audit firm 
characteristics. Finally, for some of the origi-
nal control variables I construct alternative 
proxy measures. Leverage, for example, is 
measured as the ratio of total (rather than 
long-term) debt to total assets. Results of in-
dependent variables continue to hold in re-
gressions performed using alternative proxy 
measures for control variables. 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUDING 
REMARKS 
The purpose of this study is to examine 
the association between the magnitude of earn-
ings management (proxied by discretionary ac-
cruals) and auditor quality. The two auditor 
quality characteristics are auditor independence 
(proxied by the ratio of non-audit service fees 
to total fees) and auditor specialization (meas-
ured by auditor industry market share). This 
study finds no evidence that non-audit services 
are associated with firms’ discretionary accru-
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als. This result is consistent with Chung and 
Kallapur (2003) and Reynolds et al. (2004), 
but, contrary to some previous studies (e.g., 
Frankel et al., 2002; Ferguson et al.,  2004). 
Additionally, this study finds a negative but 
insignificant relation between specialist audi-
tors and the level of earnings management. 
Thus, in contrast to previous studies (e.g., 
Reynolds and Francis , 2001; Balsam et al.,  
2003; Krishnan,  2003b), this study fails to con-
firm that specialist auditors provide better qual-
ity audit than non-specialist auditors in an Aus-
tralian context. This study then separately con-
sidered instances where: (1) the Australian cli-
ent firms are small or large and (2) the discre-
tionary accruals are positive or negative. The 
regression results on the NonAuditRatio for 
these three category sub-samples are generally 
similar to the main finding. However, further 
evidence from sub-samples regressions based 
on discretionary accruals sign indicates that the 
association between auditor specialization and 
earnings management is negative and moder-
ately significant for the income-increasing 
earnings management. Overall, empirical evi-
dence from the Australian capital market does 
not support the proposition that: (1) the pur-
chase of non-audit services may or may not 
reduce auditor independence, and (2) specialist 
auditors produce better quality audit than non-
specialist auditors. 
The findings of this study have various 
implications for policy makers, corporate man-
agement, corporate governance reformists, in-
vestors and scholarly researchers alike. For ex-
ample, there is currently appears to be a preoc-
cupation amongst corporate governance re-
formists and policy makers internationally to 
curb the provision of non-audit services by the 
incumbent auditor to aid in such matters as the 
reduction in earnings management. These find-
ings suggest this preoccupation may be mis-
placed and that constraining the ability of firms 
purchase non-audit services from the incum-
bent auditor could provide only limited benefits 
whilst increasing costs (such as any discount 
offered by the incumbent auditor resulting from 
cost savings achieved through knowledge spill-
over effects). Insights drawn from this study 
may be of assistance to policy makers as they 
consider the costs and benefits associated with 
varying levels of audit market concentration. 
These findings provide stronger support for 
allowing the audit market to operate in a basic 
lassez-faire manner without any overbearing 
interference by policy makers. 
Whilst I have attempted to maintain the 
integrity of this study research method support-
ed by various sensitivity and robustness checks, 
this study like any other empirical investigation 
is not without certain caveats. Earnings man-
agement, auditor independence and auditor 
specialization are all unobservable, therefore, 
this study relies on proxy measures that whilst 
previous used in the research literature are not 
free of criticism. For instance, discretionary 
accrual models measure discretionary accruals 
with error. These problems, however, are en-
demic to the respective literature and I am us-
ing the best currently available models and 
proxies. Future studies can seek to focus on 
refinements to the proxy measures for depend-
ent and experimental variables. Another limita-
tion is this study does not consider the com-
pounding influences of firm-wide versus of-
fice-level influences (this is of particular im-
portance to for audit specialization). Thus, fu-
ture research can be conducted to investigate 
linkages identified in this study. 
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1 Most previous studies use non-audit service fees data from U.K. and U.S. publicly traded companies disclosed in the compa-
nies’ annual reports. The U.K. data on non-audit service fees are available over a larger period of time compare to the U.S. data. 
The U.K. government have been required publicly companies to disclose audit and non-audit fees information in their annual 
reports since 1992. This information has been a mandatory item to be disclosed for the U.S. publicly companies only since the 
beginning of the year 2000. Consequently, studies using the U.K. audit and non-audit fees data provide an opportunity to diversi-
fy away time-specific effects. 
2 Statistical tests are not influenced by the retention or removal of outliers. However, the explanatory power of models tested is 
lower if the influential data points are retained. 
3 I also measure auditor independence using alternative proxy measurement techniques. As described in the “Sensitivity and Ro-
bustness Check” subsection analysis performed using alternative proxy measures for auditor independence did not lead to dra-
matically different findings from those reported in the main text. 
4 Some prior researchers (e.g., Hogan and Jeter, 1999) sum the two or three largest shares into a two/three-firm industry concen-
tration ratio. As I investigate industry specialization by individual firms we use a single-firm measure.  
5 As described in the Sensitivity Analysis sub-section I also defined an audit firm as a specialist using alternative techniques as 
defined in prior literature. Whilst alternative proxy measures for defining an audit firm as a specialist is employed results from 
the statistical tests are not affected. 
6 Audit firms do not publish specific information about their industry specialization or how such notations are defined. To my 
best knowledge there is no theoretically based methodology described in the literature to define industries. Thus, researchers rely 
on forming reasonable proxies. I rely on the ASX classification schema due as it has a long accepted and recognized base within 
the Australian capital market, and amongst its participants. 
7 23.38% of the full Australian samples did not purchase any non-audit services from their incumbent auditors. 
8 The higher the level of non-audit fees that auditors receive from their clients, the more incentives they will agree with the client’ 
accounting choices. 
9 PWC is a specialist auditor in the ASX-Materials, ASX-Health Care Equipment & Services, ASX-Real Estate, ASX-Software & 
Services, ASX-Technology Hardware & Equipment and ASX-Telecommunication Services. KPMG is an expertise in the ASX-
Energy, ASX-Materials, ASX-Capital Good, ASX-Automobiles & Components, ASX-Hotels, Restaurants & Leisure, ASX-Media, 
ASX-Food & Staples Retailing, ASX-Health Care Equipment & Services, ASX-Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology, ASX-Real 
Estate and ASX-Other (Transportation & Utilities). While, EY specializes in the ASX-Energy, ASX-Capital Goods, ASX-
Commercial Services & Supplies, ASX-Media, ASX-Retailing, ASX-Health Care Equipment & Services, ASX-Pharmaceuticals & 
Biotechnology and ASX-Technology Hardware & Equipment. 
10 The results of determination auditor industry specialization according to the criteria employed in this study are generally con-
sistent with the industries in which the Big-4 auditors declare they are expertise. 
11 This sample represents 20.79% (325 out of 1,563 firms) of population. At the population level, total companies audited by the 
Big-4 accounting firm are 879 companies or 56.24%. 
12 As shown in Table 4, a specialist auditor in the ASX-Food & Staples Retailing industry is KPMG. Even though this audit firm 
has earned 71.73% of industry market share, this is based on just one out of ten clients in the ASX-Food & Staples Retailing in-
dustry. 
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13 Using the same country data set, but different time periods Koh (2003) and Davidson, Goodwin-Stewart & Kent (2005) report-
ed the means for discretionary accruals are 7.70% and -7.00%, respectively. 
14For example, using Australian data in the fiscal years from 1990 to 2000, Holland & Ramsay (2003) reported mean of net profit 
after tax and cash flow from operations (both figures are scaled by the beginning-of-year book value of total assets) are -7.20% 
and -0.90%, respectively.  
15 51.69% (168 out of 325firms) of the sample firms experienced loss in the fiscal year end 30 June 2004. 
16As a further check for multicollinearity this thesis performs the model estimations reported in Table 7 to 9 again after first ex-
cluding ROI and then CashFlowOp. The independent exclusion of each respective control variable does not significant alter the 
findings reported in the main text. 
17 The positive sign on NonAuditRatio implies that the larger portion of non-audit fees that auditors receive from audit clients the 
more likely they compromise their independence. 
18 This study also re-performs the tests in Panels A and C (based on the Equations A and C) after excluding companies that have 
not purchased any non-audit services from their audit firms. These results are qualitatively the same as those reported in Table 7. 
1926.15% (85 out of 325 firms) of the Australian sample is firms in the ASX-Materials industry sector. Firms are included in the 
ASX-Materials industry group consist of Chemicals, Construction Materials, Containers & Packaging, Metals & Mining and 
Paper & Forest Products industries. 90.59% (77 out of 85) of firms that include in the ASX-Materials industry group is the Met-
als & Mining industry. 
